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THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND FREEDOM
OF CHOICE IN PERSONAL SERVICE
OCCUPATIONS: A REAPPRAISAL
Harry N. Sckeibert
A recent article by Alfred Avins argues that antidiscrimination laws
affecting personal service occupations violate the thirteenth amendment
by compelling involuntary servitude.1 It is the purpose of this article
to suggest that some of the historical evidence adduced by Dr. Avins is
fallacious; and that at least one judicial decision, the substance of which
is essential to his argument, is represented inaccurately.
The key issue concerns the intent of Congress when it incorporated
into the thirteenth amendment a prohibition against involuntary servi-
tude, together with one against slavery. Dr. Avins explains this by
asserting that Congress "intended to enact the provisions of the North-
west Ordinance, familiar to so many Senators as part of the constitutions
of their own states."2 He argues, moreover, that judicial interpretations
of the ordinance were meant to be "carried along with the language of
the ordinance itself into the United States Constitution."'
This writer is in agreement that Congress was cognizant of juri-
dical experience under the 1787 ordinance when it expressly prohibited
involuntary servitude in the thirteenth amendment. However, the Avins
article misinterprets that experience in the courts of states which were
created from the Northwest Territory.
Article 6 of the Northwest Ordinance declared: "There shall be
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said Territory, otherwise
than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted . .. ." Dr. Avins cites only two cases, Matter of Clark4
and Phoebe v. Jay," to illustrate that:
[T]he words "involuntary servitude," as found in the Northwest Ordi-
" A.B. 1955, Columbia College; MA. 1957, Ph.D. 1962, Cornell University. Assistant
Professor of History, Dartmouth College. Author of the Wilson Administration and Civil
Liberties (1960).
1 Avins, "Freedom of Choice in Personal Service Occupations: Thirteenth Amendment
Limitations on Antidiscrimination Legislation," 49 Cornell L.Q. 228 (1964) [hereinafter
cited as Avins]. Of the constitutionality of antidiscrimination laws affecting public service
occupations under the thirteenth amendment, Avins asserts (id. at 229) that dissent in
Browning v. Slenderella Systems, 54 Wash. 2d 440, 341 P.2d 859 (1959) is the only case that
"has ever discussed this question." However, see dissenting opinion of Harlan, J., in The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 26 (1883) arguing that the thirteenth amendment supported
the effort in the Civil Rights Act, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) to eradicate the "badges and
incidents" of slavery.
2 Avins 236. See also id. at 230 nn.11-16.
3 Id. at 236.
4 1 Blackf. 122 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1821).
5 1 Ill. (Breese) 268 (1828).
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nance, and incorporated into the state constitutions of Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, and Ohio, have their ordinary and natural meaning. They mean
service or labor which is not, at all times, performed voluntarily, and
without any legal or other compulsion. 6
Matter of Clark is summarized correctly as effectively banning in-
voluntary servitude in Indiana. It is relevant to add that one year earlier,
the same court, in State v. Lasselle,7 freed a Negress who was the
daughter of a slave held in bondage in Indiana prior to the advent of
American sovereignty in the Northwest Territory. The decision ignored
the Northwest Ordinance, applying instead the express prohibition
against slavery contained in the 1816 Indiana Constitution.' "It is ev-
ident," the court asserted:
[T]hat the framers of our Constitution intended a total and entire pro-
hibition of slavery in this State .... And it can not be presumed that the
Constitution, which is the collected voice of the citizens of Indiana, de-
claring their united will, would guarantee to one part of the community
such privileges as would totally defeat and destroy privileges and rights
guarantied to another. From these premises it follows, as an irresistible
conclusion, that, under our present form of government, slavery can have
no existence in the State of Indiana....9
Lasselle and Matter of Clark represent two faces of the same coin.
The earlier decision eliminated outright slavery dating from the time
of French or British sovereignty. But it left in question the status of
a second class of Negroes in Indiana: those who, obviously under duress,
had indentured themselves under a territorial law of 1807.10 The law
of 180711 had permitted indenture of Negroes for any term of years,
and it bound the children of such servants to the masters until they
had reached ages thirty (if male) or twenty-eight (if female). Matter
of Clark rendered slavery-by-indenture illegal in Indiana by ruling that
an action for habeas corpus itself "proves the service to be involuntary"
and a violation of the state constitution.'
In Phoebe the Illinois Supreme Court pursued an entirely different
course, and it is curious that Dr. Avins should have cited its effect as
identical to that of Matter of Clark."3 In Phoebe the same territorial
6 Avins 232.
7 1 Blackf. 60 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1820).
8 Ind. Const. art. 11, § 7 (1816). The decision also cited Ind. Const. art. 1, § 1 (1816)
that "all men are born equally free," etc. and Ind. Const. art. 1, § 24 (1816). State v.
Lasselle, supra note 7, at 61-62.1 Id. at 62.
10 Ford, A H1istory of Illinois 32 (1894); Philbrick, Laws of Indiana Territory, at
cxxxvi (1930).
11 Ind. Terr. Laws (1807), ch. 64, §§ 1-14; Philbrick, supra note 10, at 523. For earlier
legislation of a similar nature, cf. id. at 136.
12 Matter of Clark, 1 Blackf. 122, 125-26 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1821).
13 Avins 231-32.
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statute of 1807, permitting Negro indenture for any term of years, was
at issue. A Negro woman had indentured herself in 1814 to serve Jay
for forty years. Dr. Avins correctly quotes the decision as stating that
the 1807 law violated article 6 of the Northwest Ordinance." But that
statement was qualified by the court in an introductory clause which
reads: "If the only question to be decided was, whether this law .. .
conflicted with the ordinance, I should have no hesitation in saying that
it did."15 In fact, the indentured was not freed, as Dr. Avins implies.
The decision went further, asserting that the ordinance was irrelevant
and that the 1818 Illinois constitution controlled. The Negress was kept
in servitude, in accord with article VI, section 3 of the Illinois con-
stitution, which declared:
Each and every person who has been bound to service by contract or
indenture in virtue of the laws of Illinois Territory heretofore existing
and in conformity with the provisions of the same, without fraud or
collusion, shall be held to a specific performance of their contracts or
indentures; and such negroes and mulattoes as have been registered in
conformity with the aforesaid laws, shall serve out the time appointed
by said laws .... 16
This decision was consistent with the Indiana cases only in the sense
that it applied the state constitution. The court declared that Congress
had approved the constitution upon admitting Illinois as a state, despite
the fact that in the debate thereon article VI, section 3 "was conceded
to be a violation . . . of the ordinance."'1 7 By so admitting Illinois to
statehood, Congress "gave their consent to the abrogation of so much
of the ordinance as was in opposition to our constitution."' 8 Phoebe be-
came infamous in Illinois for perpetuating long-term Negro indenture
under the old 1807 territorial law. 9
Fifteen years later, the doctrine of Phoebe was still being applied.
Thus the Illinois court refused to grant freedom, in Sarah v. Borders,20
to a Negress who had indentured herself in 1815 for a period of forty
years. Concerning article VI, section 3 of the state constitution, the court
asserted:
14 Id. at 231.
15 Phoebe v. Jay, 1 Ill. (Breese) 268, 270 (1828).
16 Ill. Const. art. 6, § 3 (1818) continued: "Provided, however, that the children here-
after born of such persons, negroes or mulattoes, shall become free, the males at the age
of 21 years, the females at the age of 18 years."
17 Phoebe v. Jay, supra note 15, at 272.
18 Ibid.
19 Harris, The History of Negro Servitude in Illinois 101 (1904). Later decisions am-
plifying the doctrine of Phoebe include Choisser v. Hargrave, 2 IIl. (1 Scam.) 317 (1836);
Boon v. Juliet, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 258 (1836). Kinney v Cook, 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 232 (1841)
placed the burden of proof upon the alleged slaveowner or master of an indentured
servant, contrary to the practice in the slave states of the South.
20 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 341 (1843).
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It is not the province of the Court to determine whether it was
politic, just, or humane, but simply whether the people in Convention
had the power to fix the condition of people of color, thus situated [i.e.,
indentured under the 1807 law] at the adoption of our Constitution. This
question came directly in judgment in the case of Phoebe v. Jay ....
[W]e must affirm the correctness of that judgment.21
The court therefore rejected the contention of Lyman Trumbull,
counsel for the appellant, that the indenture was void because the 1807
law was in conflict with the Northwest Ordinance.2 2 Not until Jarrot
v. Jarrot3 in 1845 did the Illinois court rule that outright slavery, de-
riving from the period antedating American sovereignty, was illegal.
This had been done in Indiana in State v. Lasselle24 a quarter century
earlier. And not until 1847 was the legality of Negro indentures under
the 1807 territorial law finally cast in doubt in Illinois.
25
These facts place the congressional debate of the thirteenth amend-
ment in an entirely different context from that suggested by Dr. Avins.
The amendment as enacted was drafted by Lyman Trumbull, then
United States Senator from Illinois. The amendment provides: "Neither
slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United
States." As Dr. Avins notes at page 234, Senator Charles Sumner
wished to exclude reference to involuntary servitude, asserting that
"slavery in our own day is something distinct, perfectly well known,
requiring no words of distinction outside of itself." Sumner offered as
a substitute for Trumbull's language: "All persons are equal before the
law, so that no person can hold another as a slave. '2 6 Trumbull re-
sponded that the wording adopted from the Northwest Ordinance would
"accomplish the purpose." Senator Jacob Howard of Michigan sup-
ported Trumbull, declaring that the sixth article of the 1787 ordinance
was "an expression which has been adjudicated upon repeatedly, which
is perfectly well understood both by the public and by judicial tribu-
nals .... ;)27
Dr. Avins deems this exchange sufficient proof that "Senator Sum-
21 Id. at 345.
22 Id. at 346 (concurring opinion).
23 7 I1. (2 Gilm.) 1 (1845) holding that the Northwest Ordinance, art. 6 had abro-
gated slaveholders' rights to slaves antedating American sovereignty. The same doctrine
had been propounded in Harry v. Decker, 1 Miss. (Walker) 36 (1818).
24 1 Blackf. 60 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 1820).
25 Cf. Harris, supra note 19, at 119.
26 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1483 (1864) quoted in Avins 234.
27 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1489 .(1864) quoted in Avins 235. Howard no
doubt referred to Merry v. Chexnaider, 8 Mar. N.S. 699 (La. 1830); Forsyth v. Nash, 2
Mar. 385 (La. 1816); Harry v. Decker, supra note 23 for the proposition that a slave
born in the Northwest Territory was entitled to his freedom since according to art. 6 of
the ordinance "there could be therein neither slavery nor involuntary servitude." Cf. Merry
v. Tiffin, 1 Mo. 725 (1827); Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472 (1824).
19641
CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
ner proposed to declare all men equal, but Congress rejected this. In-
stead of enacting equality, it enacted liberty."2 It appears more rea-
sonable to contend that Trumbull and others wished to incorporate the
prohibition against involuntary servitude, not to avoid "enacting equal-
ity" but rather to assure that no state court might mistake the intent
of Congress and perpetuate effective Negro slavery under the guise of
indentures permitted under a state constitution. There is no, question
either that advocates of the amendment were much concerned about
equality; to pretend otherwise is to ignore the substance of the debates.
An opponent, Joseph Edgerton, asserted that the amendment would
accomplish "the abolition of slavery in the United States, and the
political and social elevation of Negroes to all the rights of white
men." 29 Lyman Trumbull himself was author of the 1865 civil rights
bill, which was designed, as he said, to implement the thirteenth amend-
ment and to "abolish slavery, not only in name but in fact."3 Trumbull
declared: "It is idle to say that a man is free who cannot go and conie
at pleasure, who cannot buy and sell, who cannot enforce his rights."131
I take it that any statute which is not equal to all, and which deprives
any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens, is. an unjust
encroachment upon his liberty; and is, in fact, a badge of servitude
which, by the Constitution, is prohibited.3 2
It is impossible to accept the view that Trumbull, who throughout his
career in the Illinois bar assaulted repeatedly the doctrine of Phoebe,
conceived the thirteenth amendment as designed to do otherwise than
"enact equality." 3 It is doubly ironic that Dr. Avins should make this
argument by way of a misunderstanding of the import of Phoebe in
the history of Negro servitude in the old Northwest. Rejection by the
western Senators of Sumner's effort to omit reference to involuntary
servitude is readily understood in light of their experience with the
Phoebe doctrine in the courts of Illinois.
A final objection relates to Dr. Avins' conclusion. Here he asserts,
at page 255, that the thirteenth amendment "confers on every person
the absolute and unfettered right to refuse, for any reason or none at
all, to serve any other person." He claims that in the 1860's Negroes
had a virtual monopoly of the very service occupations which are af-
28 Avins 236.
29 Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2987 (1864); cf. id., 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 142-43
(1865) (remarks of Godlove S. Orth). A perceptive review of the debates is in tenBroek,
Antislavery Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment 137-224 (1951).80 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1865) quoted in tenBroek, supra note 29, at 159,.
31 Ibid.
32 Quoted in id. at 168.
33 Cf. Harris, supra note 19, at 123.
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fected today by various state antidiscrimination laws. It is paradoxical,
he declares, that the present civil rights movement seeks to -force white
barbers, bootblacks, waiters, etc., to serve Negroes, whereas a centufy
ago Negroes were freed from some compulsion (never clearly defined)
to serve white customers 4
This argument contains two fallacies. In the first place, the alleged
Negro monopoly of service occupations was hardly complete, if indeed
even significant, in 1861. In a few localities, such as Baltimore, free
Negroes had predominated in certain service trades at an earlier period;
but their position had eroded seriously as early as the 1840's under
pressure of competition from whites.35 The problems faced by free
Negroes in service occupations did not derive from any compulsion
to serve whites, but rather from disabilities imposed upon Negroes in
the courts, from lack of educational opportunities equivalent to those
available to their white competitors, and from racial prejudice against
them 6 Moreover, the actual magnitude of free-Negro employment in
service trades should not be over-emphasized. In North Carolina, for
example, the 1860 census listed only twenty-five free Negroes as bar-
bers, three as bartenders, twenty-four as hack drivers, and six as
waiters; compared with 1,048 as farmers, 1,587 as common laborers,
and 1,716 as farmhands7 Similarly, in Indiana the 1850 census listed
2,150 free Negroes, of who i 976 were farmers and 720 were laborers.3 8
Where free Negroes did achieve a local monopoly in one of the serv-
ice trades, as in barbering in South Carolina, by the 1880's "colored
barbers were gradually being relegated to serving only Negro cus-
tomers . . . ,,'1 By the late 1890's segregation and disfranchisement
legislation, together with emergent de facto segregationist practices, had
become a monument to cynical evasion of constitutional guarantees of
equal rights. It is this tragic development which antidiscrimination laws,
fully consistent with the spirit and intent of the thirteenth amendment,
are intended to correct.4
Finally, in view of the fact that about ninety per cent of American
Negroes were slaves in 1860, it is absurd to construe the thirteenth
amendment as designed somehow to "free" the remaining ten per cent
34 Avins 252-55. The issue is clouded by introduction of the Emancipation Proclamation,
id. at 252, yet the entire thrust of the argument makes the thirteenth amendment the chief
point of reference. Cf. id. at 255 n.143.
35 Cf. Wright, The Free Negro in Maryland 149 (1921).
36 Franklin, The Free Negro in North Carolina 136 (1943); Wright, supra note 35,
at 165-73.
37 Franklin, supra note 36, at 134-35.
38 Thornbrough, The Negro in Indiana Before 1900, at 133 (1957).
39 Tindall, South Carolina Negroes, 1877-1900, at 129 (1952).
40 Cf. Woodward, Strange Career of Jim Crow ch. 2 (1957).
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from compulsion to "serve whites." The concept of involuntary servi-
tude, in the context of experience in Illinois and elsewhere, centered
upon long-term indenture of Negroes as an evasion of prohibitions
against slavery. Dr. Avins cites no single line in the congressional de-
bates that related involuntary servitude to the question of personal
service occupations, and there is no sound evidence that Lyman Trum-
bull and others had such a relationship in mind when they advocated
the thirteenth amendment.
